Can Northeast India survive Bangladesh’s policy shift?
With its unique geographical, political, and economic positioning, this northeastern region of India stands at a precarious crossroads, potentially facing setbacks as Bangladesh’s foreign policy shifts away from India.News Arena Network - Guwahati - UPDATED: October 5, 2024, 05:53 PM - 2 min read
Northeast India’s relationship with Bangladesh has always been one of strategic interdependence.
The recent resignation of Sheikh Hasina as the Prime Minister of Bangladesh and the rise of Muhammad Yunus to leadership have caused ripples in both regional and international political circles.
While much attention has been paid to the political changes in Dhaka, one of the most immediate and profound impacts could be felt in Northeast India.
With its unique geographical, political, and economic positioning, this northeastern region of India stands at a precarious crossroads, potentially facing setbacks as Bangladesh’s foreign policy shifts away from India.
As we assess the situation, it is imperative to adopt a different perspective—one that considers not just the potential losses or gains, but the long-term challenges and opportunities that Northeast India must navigate in light of these political changes.
A delicate connection
Northeast India’s relationship with Bangladesh has always been one of strategic interdependence. With the region’s isolation from mainland India due to its geographical location, its reliance on Bangladesh for connectivity, trade, and security has been profound.
States like Assam, Meghalaya, and Tripura benefit immensely from the access to Bangladesh’s ports and transport routes, notably the Chittagong port. These ties are not merely economic; they provide the lifeline for essential supplies, smooth transit, and cultural exchanges that have sustained the region for decades.
This interdependence extends beyond material needs. The people-to-people relationships, particularly among ethnic groups such as the Bengalis, Chakmas, and Garos, further bind the two regions.
These ties have been cemented through a shared history, most notably during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, when the Northeastern states played a pivotal role in supporting the Mukti Bahini and hosting refugees.
Implications for security and stability
While Sheikh Hasina’s tenure strengthened bilateral ties, particularly in areas such as counter-insurgency and border security, the leadership of Muhammad Yunus may introduce uncertainty.
One of the key successes of Hasina’s government was its cooperation with India in curbing insurgent activities along the border.
The signing of key agreements, such as the 2013 Extradition Treaty and the 2015 Land Border Agreement, helped limit the influence of insurgent groups in Bangladesh.
Hasina’s government actively worked to dismantle insurgent camps, which were often used by militants from the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and other separatist groups to launch attacks on Indian soil.
Under Yunus’s leadership, there are concerns that these security arrangements might unravel. If the new government takes a different approach towards India, there is a potential for insurgency to regain a foothold in Bangladesh, creating a resurgence in cross-border terrorism and insurgent operations.
For the already volatile Northeast, this could exacerbate existing security challenges, especially since the region is home to over 140 insurgent groups.
The economic and geopolitical consequences
For the Northeast, the geographical isolation from the rest of India presents persistent economic challenges, making its ties with Bangladesh crucial for development.
The region relies heavily on the transshipment facilities through Bangladesh, including projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the Agartala-Akhaura Rail Link, which have significantly improved trade routes and reduced transportation costs.
These projects are not just economic ventures but critical geopolitical initiatives that aim to integrate the Northeast more deeply into India’s economic and strategic fold.
However, with the new government in Bangladesh signalling a potential pivot away from India, these initiatives might be delayed or disrupted.
A reduction in trade and increased tariffs could further marginalise the Northeastern states, already struggling with underdevelopment and unemployment.
The stakes are particularly high for projects like the Tripura-Bangladesh Power Project, which supplies electricity from the Palatana power plant in Tripura to Bangladesh.
A policy shift could see this energy cooperation curtailed, affecting both regions.
Implications on culture
Beyond economics and security, the cultural ties between Bangladesh and Northeast India are equally at risk. The shared heritage, language, and ethnicity that have long fostered goodwill between the two sides could suffer in the wake of political changes.
The ethnic communities straddling both sides of the border, including Bengalis, Garos, and Chakmas, are deeply intertwined, not just through trade but through marriages, festivals, and everyday social exchanges.
A shift in foreign policy or a deterioration in diplomatic ties could lead to stricter border controls, curtailing these cross-border interactions and creating a sense of division in communities that have historically existed as a continuum across the border.
Such disruptions would not only impact cultural ties but also lead to a loss of trust between the people of these regions, which could take decades to rebuild.
Alternatives for Northeast India
While Bangladesh’s changing political landscape may present significant challenges, Northeast India is not without alternatives.
The region can look towards developing its ties with other neighbouring countries, particularly within the framework of India’s ‘Act East’ policy.
By enhancing relations with Southeast Asian nations, such as Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, the Northeast can diversify its trade routes and reduce its overdependence on Bangladesh.
Projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, connecting Kolkata to Myanmar’s Sittwe port, and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway offer viable alternatives for boosting connectivity.
These routes, though still under development, could eventually provide the Northeast with a strategic gateway to Southeast Asia, reducing its reliance on Bangladesh’s ports.
Furthermore, the region’s inclusion in broader Southeast Asian trade networks, particularly through partnerships like ASEAN and BIMSTEC, could foster greater economic growth.
Japan’s increasing investment in the region, particularly in infrastructure development, offers another avenue for boosting the Northeast’s economic prospects.
On the security front, enhancing border patrols and strengthening internal security mechanisms, such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), could help mitigate the risks posed by a resurgent insurgency.
Additionally, fostering deeper intelligence-sharing and counter-insurgency cooperation with other neighbouring countries, particularly Myanmar, could help fill the security void that might emerge with a changing Bangladesh.
The resignation of Sheikh Hasina and the political shift in Bangladesh under Muhammad Yunus’s leadership represent a turning point for both Bangladesh and India’s Northeast.
The longstanding relationship between the two regions, built on shared history, culture, and economic ties, is now at a crossroads. For Northeast India, the potential setbacks in trade, security, and connectivity are substantial, but they also offer an opportunity to rethink and diversify the region’s strategic partnerships.