Investigators have established that the militant group behind the deadly April 22 ambush in Pahalgam infiltrated into Kashmir through the Dera Ki Gali (DKG) route in Poonch, where it had been active since late 2022 or early 2023.
Security agencies have linked the group to a string of high-profile attacks on Indian security forces in the Jammu region, before it shifted its operations to the Valley in the second half of 2024. Officials believe the group maintained a low profile in Poonch’s dense terrain, using mountainous routes to evade detection and surveillance.
The first significant incident attributed to the outfit occurred on 21 December 2023, when an ambush near Dera Ki Gali in the Bufliaz area of Surankote left four Indian Army soldiers dead. Intelligence later confirmed the same group’s hand in the May 2024 ambush on an Indian Air Force convoy at Bakrabal Mohalla near Sanai.
By August–September last year, the militants were believed to have crossed into the Kashmir Valley using the same DKG-Bufliaz infiltration route. Upon entering Budgam, the outfit reportedly divided into two modules—one moving towards Gulmarg and the other to Sonmarg—to facilitate coordinated attacks.
The Sonmarg module struck first, with a local militant, Junaid, and his Pakistani associate opening fire on non-local labourers on 20 October. Six days later, the second group launched an attack on Army trucks in Gulmarg.
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In a major counter-offensive, security forces tracked Junaid to Harwan in Srinagar, where he was killed. His Pakistani associate managed to escape. During the extended operation, images recovered from Junaid’s phone linked the group conclusively to the earlier Poonch attacks, reinforcing suspicions of a wider cross-regional strategy.
Subsequent investigations suggest the two splinter groups later regrouped to carry out the April 22 assault in Pahalgam. The operation, which claimed the lives of 26 people, is now seen as a culmination of meticulous planning and consolidation.
Post-attack intelligence-gathering detected communication signals from three distinct locations—Hapatnar, Tral, and DH Pora—suggesting a wider area of operation and multiple hideouts or safe zones being used by the terrorists.
“It appears these communication transmissions were not only tactical but also served as diversions to mislead tracking teams operating in the mountainous stretches,” said a senior security official familiar with the probe.
A critical takeaway from the investigation has been the group's exclusive use of rugged terrain. By entirely avoiding road routes, the militants successfully eluded the network of highway surveillance and checkposts, exploiting the Valley’s vast interconnected mountain corridors to move, regroup, and strike.
Security agencies, now armed with a more complete understanding of the group's movement patterns, continue to intensify counter-insurgency operations across South Kashmir, focusing efforts on intercepting and isolating the remnants of the group.
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