dethreading-the-conundrum-of-insurgency

By Lt Gen (Retd) TS Shergill

 

In all our experiences of insurgency in India, we have used euphemisms like ‘Militants,’ ‘Anti National Elements,’ ‘Khalistani’ and ‘Naxals’ to disguise a distasteful political eruption. An insurgency breeds on a cause within a sanctuary of an inimical neighbouring state and terror, as it’s shop window to gain attention.

 

‘Sanctuary’ is exceedingly important for an insurgent; it is its very oxygen and cause, gives insurgents invisibility amongst the public. A long duration of an insurgency and economic improvement of the people, tends to greatly reduce its virulence.

 

Continuation of insurgency in Kashmir is mainly because of sanctuary that provides men, material, sectarian fervour and boosts cause whenever it falters with time and the watering of economic roots. I once asked the chief minister of J&K that if, the Government of India focused itself on the economy of the state and raised the per-capita income of J&K much higher than POK, would the people of POK want a merger with J&K much as the people of erstwhile East Germany desired union with West Germany; he replied “toba, toba! (God forbid).” 

 

His fear no doubt was the demographic change that would result in favouring the Punjabi-Pahari speaking people of POK. From the Nasta Chun Pass in an arc south and then east along the Pir Pinjal to Kishtwar, Punjab-Pahari is spoken. North and east from that pass into Gurez and North, Sunni gives over to the Shia faith and Daari or Balti is spoken.

 

A brutal shop window of terror has been displayed at Pahalgam with heart-rending loss of innocent lives resulting in the people of India calling for retribution against Pakistan that unfortunately will also lead to baying for the blood of Indian Muslims.

 

In a global world, what goes around comes around and the marginalising of Muslims in India has been felt both in the Pakistan sanctuary and in Kashmir. It is to be seen whether the Government of India will handle the backlash against Indian Muslims caused by this massacre of Hindus with sagacity or let matters take their own course. There will of course be a direct response to this atrocity. However, such actions have a very short shelf life in J&K. The ending of an insurgency is essentially political in nature so that it diffuses the cause.

 

France had won the counter insurgency in Algeria and the French ‘pied noirs’ settled there asked for integration of Algeria within the Republic of France. President of France, General De Gaulle, however, felt that with integration, the Algerian population would gain a majority in France and therefore, he declined the request and instead, Algeria gained its Independence.

 

With the Pakistan sanctuary inimical to India and both nations shy of the political risk of a compromise, the limited options for India are to increase the well-being of all that live in J&K, and to make the Army even more effective against infiltration from the sanctuary.

 

Winning the trust of the people of Kashmir will not be easy. After the 13th Century CE, Kashmir has been coveted for its beauty and later for its strategic location in respect to central Asia and now China. Its existence under its various masters has been generally an unhappy one.

 

On accession to India, J&K had a special dignity guaranteed by Article 370 of the Constitution of India. Over the years, however, the practical relevance of the Article had eroded and was merely a fig leaf of its earlier self. The abrogation of the Article and tri-furcation of the state has further hurt the dignity of the people by removal of even that fig leaf and strengthened the cause propagated from the sanctuary. The armed forces have now to surmount a further handicap of dislike of the people whose hearts and minds they need to win. This has also complicated the principle of ‘unity of command’ with three entities and egos to deal with that were earlier a bane to counter insurgency operations in the North East.

 

The Army has been in in J&K since the fourth week of October, 1947, with ever-increasing strength; two major wars have been fought over the state, a localised but high intensity one and counter insurgency has been ongoing decade after decade. The general directive to the army has been “to create a situation that allows the civil administration to function.”

 

What has occurred is a damping of insurgency, then a rise, then a fall and so on like a wave graph. This is a very broad-based directive that tends to lose focus on the real task for the Army in J&K against a sanctuary driven insurgency.

 

To my mind the directive should read: “to create such dread in those wanting to enter J&K from the sanctuary that, they do NOT do so and if they do, they know they will DIE.”

 

A study has shown that big battalions do not win insurgencies. It is the diffusion of the cause and small highly-trained and effective teams with superior intelligence that do. Just as terror as a shop window for insurgency is strategic in nature so also are successful actions of counter insurgency teams. 

 

It is very difficult for battalions that operate in counter insurgency for two years to be one hundred per cent effective all the time, particularly in a medium of operation where, the first mover advantage lies with the insurgent. It is possible, however, for small teams from those battalions that are specially trained and optimally equipped to do so. Whereas the battalion provides the anvil, small teams are the hammer. Those commanders that have tried this approach have been highly successful. There needs to be a higher percentage of small effective teams that mainly work in the infiltration zones in the mountains and plains.

 

Pakistan is in economic turmoil with insurgency in Baluchistan and a steady creep of Taliban philosophy eastwards. Playing up insurgency in Kashmir with occasional terror flash points maintains the relevance of the military with the added benefit of locking up a number of Indian divisions that cannot be deployed against it in the plains.

 

Our armed forces, have to employ new organisations to ensure that infiltration of trained insurgents from Pakistan are not only stopped but also eliminated.

 

With the marginalisation of Indian Muslims, it will be difficult to diffuse the cause of insurgency in Kashmir. In the hinterland of India, sagacious handling of this great tragedy at Pahalgam will give strength to the large majority of Kashmiris that are not insurgents to believe that, they are indeed Indian; one of their own was also killed there.

           

Lt Gen (Retd) TS Shergill PVSM, PhD; author, ‘Counter Insurgency Support to a Host Nation’ and co-author ‘Monsoon War, 1965 Indo -Pak War’.