dhaka-s-dangerous-drift-a-new-frontline

By Pranab Mondal

 

As India decisively exercised its sovereign right to self-defence through Operation Sindoor — a calibrated missile strike that dismantled terror hubs across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in response to the heinous Pahalgam massacre — one neighbour’s silence has spoken volumes: Bangladesh.

 

In a region perpetually perched on the edge of geopolitical tremors, Dhaka’s studied diplomatic silence in the wake of the April 22 slaughter of 26 Indian tourists — and India’s proportionate response — has stirred profound unease in New Delhi.

 

While regional partners such as Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives swiftly condemned terrorism and urged regional stability, Bangladesh remained conspicuously mute. When it finally issued a statement, it stopped short of condemning terror, instead praising a ceasefire and US-led mediation — carefully sidestepping any moral alignment with India’s anti-terror stance.

 

Even more disquieting was a recent inflammatory remark by Major General (Retd) ALM Fazlur Rahman, chairman of Bangladesh’s National Independent Commission of Inquiry, into the 2009 BDR mutiny. Just days before Operation Sindoor, he provocatively suggested that Bangladesh should “seize India’s north-eastern states” if New Delhi strikes Pakistan. While the Yunus-led interim government did not officially endorse the statement, neither did it condemn it—a move viewed as deliberate.

 

Worse still, intelligence from Dhaka’s military circles has confirmed an explosive meeting between Dr Asif Nazrul, the interim government's legal advisor, and Harun Izhar—chief of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)’s Bangladesh module. This clandestine rendezvous allegedly occurred less than 24 hours after the Pahalgam carnage and within the Ministry of Law itself. Izhar’s record is anything but obscure: A jihadist with longstanding ties to LeT, implicated in the 2009 aborted plot to bomb the Indian High Commission in Dhaka and named in the interrogation of 26/11 plotter David Headley.

 

Izhar's 2013 arrest, following a grenade blast at his madrasa that killed three and uncovered an IED cache, was considered a turning point in Bangladesh’s internal counterterrorism effort. His re-emergence now — sanctioned, or at least tolerated, by a government official — marks a chilling regression.

 

This disturbing inertia is symptomatic of a deeper ideological drift in Bangladesh since the ousting of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League in August 2024. The current interim regime, under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, has displayed increasing proximity to Islamist elements and strategic ambiguity towards India — a shift that has not gone unnoticed by Indian security agencies.

 

Intelligence reports confirm two covert visits by ISI delegations, one was headed by its chief Asim Mali, to Chittagong in January and February — an area historically linked to anti-India operations targeting Tripura. With Tripura’s border still partially unfenced, India’s Ministry of Home Affairs has intensified surveillance and fortified security along the sensitive frontier.

 

Further exacerbating India’s concerns is the public reappearance of Jasim Uddin Rahmani, the globally sanctioned leader of the Al-Qaeda-linked Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), at a Shahbagh protest demanding a ban on the Awami League. Rahmani — convicted in the murder of secular blogger Rajib Haider and connected to several other high-profile assassinations — was released under opaque circumstances in August 2024, despite five unresolved terror cases.

 

An MEA official confirmed, “We are fully alert. Should Rahmani step onto Indian soil, he will be apprehended.” His return to public life — amid a surge in ISI-linked activities and ABT arrests in India’s Northeast and South — marks a disturbing normalisation of terror-linked actors in Bangladeshi politics.

 

Equally alarming is the resurgence of Hizb ut-Tahrir, another banned Islamist outfit, now openly holding rallies in Dhaka. Their posters declare India an “enemy state” and call for the establishment of a caliphate — yet the administration refuses to act. Instead, it seems paralysed by political expediency or ideological sympathy.

 

Also read: A ceasefire can be mediated by a ‘third party’ only

 

A more ominous spectre unfolded recently: ISIS flags were brazenly displayed during an anti-Awami League rally in Shahbagh. Protesters chanted Urdu slogans — Pakistan’s national language — in a nation founded upon Bengali linguistic pride and soaked in the blood of 1971’s martyrs. Video footage captured five ISIS flags fluttering above Bengali placards, blurring the line between religious radicalism and political theatre. Indian intelligence is rightfully on edge.

 

Meanwhile, the direct maritime route between Karachi and Chittagong — recently revived under the guise of trade — has raised suspicions after the second cargo reportedly carried seismic explosives. The corridor, eerily reminiscent of the route exploited in the 26/11 attacks, now poses a direct logistical threat.

 

Bangladesh's ideological axis is shifting. Under the influence of Jamaat-e-Islami and a resurgent BNP, the interim regime is rewriting national history. School textbooks now claim that Ziaur Rahman — not Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman — declared independence in 1971. Secularism, once enshrined in the constitution, is under open attack.

 

This dangerous drift undermines decades of India-Bangladesh partnership founded on secularism, mutual trust, and regional cooperation. Despite being Bangladesh’s largest trade partner — supplying over 1,160 MW of electricity and supporting economic infrastructure — India now faces the emergence of a potentially hostile regime on its eastern flank.

 

The situation is no longer a matter of foreign policy — it is a matter of national security. The combination of ideological radicalisation, ISI infiltration, and economic collapse (with over 300 garment factories shut and four million jobs lost) creates a volatile powder keg at India’s doorstep.

 

Dhaka’s “neutrality” increasingly resembles passive complicity. As radical slogans echo louder and old alliances disintegrate, India must prepare for more than just diplomatic turbulence — it must brace for a tectonic strategic shift.

 

In the words of Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, “The people are the main stakeholders in India-Bangladesh relations.” But if that people’s voice is drowned by foreign-backed radicalism and an unelected regime, India’s restraint may soon wear thin.

 

The question is no longer if Dhaka is turning hostile.

 

The question is: How long can India afford to wait and watch?