how-indian-leveraged-the-s-400-to-beat-the-pak-threat

By Brig RPS Kahlon, VSM (Retd)

India declared its intent to become a nuclear military power, after it carried out a series of nuclear explosions in 1999. This was followed up enunciation of a “No First Use Nuclear Doctrine”.

 

In the next decade or so, India created and operationalised a credible nuclear deterrent force based on land, air and sea-based delivery systems (Triad). Pakistan, as usual, mirrored Indian actions, but unlike India, chose not to eschew “No First Use”, and instead stated nebulous redlines and perceived threats to justify the first use of nuclear weapons against India. Irrationality and ambiguous threshold of tolerance was the cornerstone of Pakistan nuclear strategy.

 

This imposed on India the challenge of structuring a survivable nuclear force capable of a credible second-strike after absorbing/ neutering the first strike by Pakistan.

 

The Pakistani vector for delivery of nuclear bombs was primarily air (F-16, Mirage), till it was buttressed by the CKDs and assembly line of Chinese M-11 ballistic missiles. Therein lay the genesis and urgency of building up a “Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)” in addition to robust air defense.

 

The concept of swords and shields

 

The ongoing and very successful DRDO’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Program, (IGMDP) became the basis of the swords (Prithvi, Sagrika, Agni, K-4 SLBM). The shield was lacking. The major concern was countering the Chinese M-11 Missile which could hit Delhi in a matter of 12 to 15 minutes of flying time. The requirement was to be able to detect a launch, track it and thereafter intercept it either before or immediately after it reaches its apogee (highest point of trajectory), for an exothermic engagement, or in the terminal stage of its flight at a lower altitude, for a subsequent endothermic engagement. The DRDO, on its own, had been working on a conceptual BMD since the 1980s. It was given a fresh lease of life with the Air Force and Army Air Defense envisioning an interest, as a result of the emerging threat.

 

The challenge for throwing up a credible air/ ballistic defense shield in India

 

The Indian Air Defense Shield - unlike the Israeli “Iron Dome”, which caters for defense against unguided free flight missiles in a very small geographical area, or the American Patriot and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defense) that had the luxury of time and distance for detection and engagement -  had to cater for very small reaction time for a large land expanse to protect. There was no air defense system which could be purchased off the shelf by India, to plug this gap. There was a requirement to structure a system, custom built to meet Indian needs. The operational requirement got the three services together with the DRDO, to brainstorm, conceive, jointly develop and operationalise the ‘Indian Air Defense Shield’. It was understood, that any ability to destroy a ballistic missile flying at supersonic speeds with a very small radar cross section, could be cued to also engage aircrafts with or without stealth features and other aerial threats.

 

The conceptual construct and design of the shield

 

The concept is universal and simple for an Air Defense Shield. Firstly, detect a threat as early and as far away as possible. Secondly, be able to track and engage it through its entire flight profile, till positively destroyed.

 

Designing a system for Indian needs is complex and challenging. There was a need to not only develop a mesh of acquisition and fire direction radars, but also to develop Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), for engagements at distances varying from 400 km 20 km, and at altitudes from exothermic to a few hundred meters. To be more effective, the system design included Air Defense aircrafts and Ground-Based Air Defense Systems (GBADS). The design now ran up against the challenge of detecting aerial threats along nearly a thousand km border/ LOC with Pakistan alone. It had, thereafter, to match and assign a plethora of resources available to both Air Force and Army, to take down the threat, and ensure theoretically at least near 100% success.

 

Genesis of networked detection, target assignment and engagement

 

The cornerstone of the defensive shield hinged on networking of all radars to be able to generate a real-time common air picture. Based on this common air picture, it was possible to track and prioritise the aerial threats, assign vectors for engagement, and damage assessment till elimination of threat. The networking thus, included the SAM Battery’s, AD aircraft/ fighter controllers, GBADS. The strength of the whole design was that while the vectors for engagement of air threats was a mix of Russian/ Israeli/ Indian SAM systems (Igla, Pechora, Spyder, Barak and Akash), as were the aircrafts (Su-30, Mirage, Jaguar, MiGs, Rafel, Tejas), the command, control and reporting system (C&R), the brains controlling the whole system was entirely indigenous. It consisted of made-to-order hardware (from BEL) and inhouse developed software, i.e. Army’s AKASH TEER, IAF’s IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System), and Navy’s Trigun, which spoke seamlessly to each other. A basic frame-work of a Networked Tri-Service Air Defense Shield was thus put in place. Its operating protocols including target tracking designation and engagement seamlessly across tri-service assets, available at any given time, has been refined and its ability has thereafter grown exponentially. The addition of counter UAV non-lethal vectors to this grid is a recent enhancement of its capability is an apt example of this ability.

 

Plugging the detection and engagement gap

 

The movement from an operational need, to a concept, design and operationalisation as enumerated above today seems orderly and logical in hindsight. It wasn’t so. The development was littered with failures and technical challenges, till innovative solutions were found. The most vexing challenge was bridging the gap between the detection and engagement ranges. The Indian shield had a capability to detect missiles and aircrafts at ranges in excess of 500 km but lacked a vector to engage them at that range.

 

The Indian SAMs were efficient in the layered air defense from very short ranges to medium ranges only. They lacked capabilities of long range and high-altitude engagements now being witnessed commonly as in the Patriot & THAAD systems, and thought desirable. But these systems were not only expensive but came with employment, technical and integration challenges. With everything else being in place in the Indian Missile Defense Shield, the vexing problem of a reliable terminal guidance for the Indian anti-missile vector for both endothermic and exothermic engagement was taking too long to materialise. The purchase of five S-400 systems from Russia, plugged this gap and catered for both Pakistan and China fronts.

 

Integrating and leveraging the S-400 advantage

 

The S-400 system, unified with India’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), enables seamless coordination with indigenous systems like Akash, Barak-8, and GBADS, gave the following advantages to the Indian Air Defense Shield:

 

Countering Pakistan’s missile arsenal: The S-400’s ability to intercept cruise missiles at low altitudes (20 meters) and ballistic missiles traveling at speeds up to Mach 14 provides India with a robust defence against Babur and Ra’ad cruise missiles and the Shaheen ballistic missiles.

 

Deterrence against Pakistani Air Force operations: Its 400-kilometer deep-strike capability complicates Pakistan’s air operations, forcing their jets to operate cautiously or risk being shot down.

 

Protection of key assets and cities: The S-400’s deployment creates a protective umbrella over major Indian cities and critical infrastructure, such as nuclear command canters, military bases, and economic hubs.

 

Conclusion

 

The S-400 has shifted the aerial balance in India’s favour, complicating Pakistan’s offensive capabilities and strengthening India’s deterrence. By neutralising missile and drone threats during Operation Sindoor, the system proved its worth as a force multiplier. Its ability to protect key assets and engage deep into Pakistani airspace limits Islamabad’s strategic options, forcing reliance on asymmetric tactics like terrorism or saturation attacks, as seen in subsequent engagements of Jammu, Pathankot and Jaisalmer airfields. India must continue integrating the S-400 with indigenous systems and invest in counter-hypersonic capabilities to maintain its edge.