By Brig RPS Kahlon, VSM (Retd)
Operation Sindoor, the new normal
Pakistan Army has assiduously nurtured terrorists, as instruments of its state policy of ‘thousand cuts’ to bleed India, with the strategic aim of annexing J&K. India, in spite of grave provocations, (the 2001 Parliament attack, 26/11 in Mumbai or attack on Pathankot Air Base, during PM Modi’s first term), opted for “strategic restraint”. It concentrated on diplomacy and appealing to international monitors of the ‘rule-based world order’ (UN, IMF, FATF etc) to persuade Pakistan to rein in the proxies, but, to no avail. This changed during PM Narendra Modi’s first term in office itself.
In response to the 2016 attack on Uri Brigade HQ, the Indian Army raided terrorist launch pads across the LOC. The 2019 Pulwama incident, saw the scale of response ratchet up to an air strike on Balakote terrorist training camp in PoK. Nearly a decade later, in Operation Sindoor, India carried out precise strikes on terrorist infrastructure along the entire length and depth of Pakistan.
Over the next four days, India deftly managed the escalation, while signalling intent and capability to hurt Pakistan military establishments effectively. Pakistan blinked and asked for a ceasefire. This response was a sea change from 2001, when the Indian Army mobilised, only to provide “all or nothing choice”, i.e. to either remain passive or start an all-out war.
The Indian Armed Forces, post Operation Sindoor, on the contrary, have demonstrated military options short of war, to hurt and impose costs on terrorists and by extension, Pakistan Army.
The question now tickling everyone’s mind is that while it has been equivocally stated by the Indian PM, that this is the new normal, is there something more in the offing? There was also an assertion by the Indian Defence Minister that Operation Sindoor was still ongoing. To be able to postulate a possible answer, it is important to analyse the why, what and how of this evolving new strategy, and then speculate on a possible way ahead.
Unravelling the contours of India’s Pakistan strategy
There are four possible inferences drawn by the Indian security establishment based on past events and trends which are driving the current evolving Indian offensive strategy to foil Pakistan Army’s design.
First and foremost is the realisation that Pakistan is intent to continue on its path of ‘grey zone warfare’, which for all practical purposes, seems to be cast in stone as Pakistan’s long-term strategy.
Second, Pakistan intransigence is India’s cross alone to bear, because it impacts not only India’s security concerns but also its social, economic and political well-being. The recent rant of Pakistan Army Chief, on the two-nation theory based on religion aptly highlighted this. Pakistan has to be neutered with whatever means possible if India intends to stay on its current upward trajectory of progress and economic well-being.
Third, it is obvious that threats of future punishments, however escalated, are not sufficient to dissuade the Pakistan military-terrorist complex from carrying out future terror strikes. For them, sub-conventional strikes and violence against India is intrinsic to their identity and political legitimacy. Retaliation, rather than its threat, is the new Indian instrument of dissuasion.
Imposing costs will force the adversary’s future attacks to be smaller or rarer. While the Indian military heft has been demonstrated, it will need to be reinforced periodically, to enforce ‘cumulative deterrence’.
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Fourth, India needs to effectively leverage its ‘comprehensive national power’. Operation Sindoor so far, is only the military manifestation of this strategy. The other tools of coercion like economic, diplomatic, resource denial, geographical isolation, ideological discredit etc will also need to be got to bear, simultaneously.
India walking the talk
The immediate reaction to the Pahalgam carnage on April 22 by India was placing the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in abeyance, and downsizing of the diplomatic mission and interaction.
This was followed by kinetic military strikes against terrorist infrastructure. The Pakistan riposte targeted India military installations. The four days of missile and drone strikes/ counter strikes, which followed, culminated into Pakistan DGMO asking for an unconditional ceasefire on May 10.
During this engagement, stand-off weapons, delivered from multiple domains, suitably demonstrated the Indian capability to cause attrition, impose cost, and thereby be able to dissuade. This dissuasion will need to be reinforced periodically, to ensure which, the Indian government has given an accretion of nearly Rs 50,000 crore to the Armed Forces to retain the combat edge over Pakistan.
With the IWT treaty in abeyance, India has demonstrated the ability to effectively control the flow of waters of Jhelum and Chenab, as also to deny the waters of Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to Pakistan.
India is embarking on a major diplomatic offensive, via the all-party delegations of parliamentarians scheduled to visit and brief countries which count to convey India’s justification of Operation Sindoor. This should go a long way to isolate Pakistan globally as a terrorist state.
The grey zone warfare against the Pakistan Army is already seeing an upswing. Targeted killings of terrorist leaders has recommenced. The Baloch Liberation Army has ratcheted by the intensity and frequency of attacks on Pakistan Army. India can and may provide various forms of support to these actions. India is walking the talk so far.
Conclusion
To conclude, the strategy of imposing cost on the terrorist and Pakistan Army, is preferable to the earlier passive “strategic restraint” as it breaks the status quo. Pakistan will, over a period of time, develop counter measures and capabilities, and this strategy of attrition will yield diminishing returns. India will need to develop tactical skills to manage the escalation of costs imposed thereof.
Military and socio-politico-economic coercion can only work for a period of time. The final solution has to be political and bilateral. Absent a political solution, this strategy anticipates that Pakistan Army-terrorist sub-conventional attacks can be contained, but will never end. This, in the immediate future, is not a bad outcome, as long as it enables India to stay on its path of economic, military and technological growth unimpeded.
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