By Brig RPS Kahlon, VSM (Retd)
When JeM terrorists struck the Indian Army Brigade Headquarters in Uri on September 18, 2016, the new political dispensation in India sanctioned a surgical strike on terror launch pads. It was successfully executed on September 26, 2016. A new normal of punitive retaliation was thus, unequivocally stated.
Three years later, the Pulwama suicide attack on the CRPF convoy takes place on February 14, 2019. The Indian government responds with an escalated punitive retaliation. The Balakote airstrike is successfully executed on February 26, 2019, and the subsequent PAF riposte is foiled. The intent of punitive strike, with the willingness to escalate the depth, intensity and sensitivity of target is reinforced.
Now, nearly six years later, Pakistan and its proxies carry out the targeted execution of 27 unarmed tourists in Baisaran Valley on April 22, 2025. There is universal condemnation of the heinous act.
While the two countries go through the process of tit-for-tat diplomatic missives and economic, travel restrictions, there is an undercurrent of expectation of the Indian retaliatory strike, the punitive nature of which will be escalated from the previous strikes.
So, after the launch pads, which was next escalated to training camps, is it now the time to decapitate the hydra by targeting the LeT HQ at Muridke, or a similarly sensitive target, irrespective of its location in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) or Pakistan?
While it is the job of an armchair strategist to speculate, and the media houses to educate, and turn out a concise readable copy, the more onerous and difficult task of deciding the next course of punitive action weighs heavy with those in power and at the helm of national security and intelligence make up in the country, which needs to be respected. They are, ever since the CCS meet, post-Pahalgam massacre, grappling with the why, what, where, when and how of the issue.
The why of Pahalgam massacre will logically drive the subsequent, what, where and how of this challenge. There are two possibilities that can be speculated upon. The first is that this is the blowback of the successful grey zone warfare waged in the intervening years. The Pahalgam massacre is an overt signal by the Pak ISI/ deep state to its Indian counterpart to back off, otherwise problems would arise in the Valley and possibly even in Punjab. If this be so, it affirms the success of purported Indian grey zone operations, as alleged by Pakistan. There is no reason why the Indian establishment should not carry on with more of the same.
The second possibility is that this heinous act of the Pakistan proxies is unrelated to the country’s internal security situation, and is a deliberate act to destabilise the Valley, with the view to rejuvenate the separatist movement. This mandates a fitting response.
What could be this possible punitive response?
Pakistan has already been tutored to expect a retaliatory strike, and will take pre-emptive defensive measures. The launch pads would have been de-congested, the training camps emptied, and the vital leadership of the proxy organisation whisked away into safe areas or taken into protective custody to avert a de-capitating strike.
The security forces themselves would be in precautionary defensive deployments. NOTAMs for restriction of Pakistan airspace have been issued and the Air Defense network of the country is on high alert. Punitive raids by ground forces or air assets may, now, not yield the earlier degree of success. An alternate strategy needs to be adopted for any punitive action.
The alternative punitive strategy against Pakistan can vary in intensity from demonstrations, which are already ongoing in the form of the air exercise (Akraman), the sea exercise, (for which aircraft carrier group has already deployed,) and ground exercises in Punjab and Rajasthan along the Pakistan border. The exhibition of intent and capability may include missile firing, simulated sea blockade, fire power demonstrations including stand-off attacks. The rhetoric and intent have to be buttressed by capability and demonstrated ability, to deter and dissuade.
This demonstration could be escalated to a standoff multi-directional precision attack if required using a combination of missiles, drones, and glide bombs at the time and place of choosing. However, the bigger challenge here is not the execution of the strike, but controlling the escalation and the narrative thereafter. If the notion of victory or the effectiveness of the punitive strike is not believed by the nation, the target country and the world at large, the very exercise of the punitive strike may be counterproductive.
Whatever external punitive strategy is adopted, internally the highest priority will be to eliminate first and foremost the propagators of the Pahalgam massacre. They have been identified and are being pursued with due vigour. Simultaneously would be an all-out effort to eliminate the remaining terrorist cells, and neutralisation of the over ground workers (OGW) network. The immediate aim would be to sanitise the area well in time for the Amarnath Yatra. The long-term aim will be to create a secure environment, which would lure the tourists back to the Valley as hithertofore. This is no easy task, and will require sacrifice in blood and guts, with no fixed time lines. The security forces are in for a long haul.
To conclude, the dynamic, pro-active Prime Minister of the nation has given an unambiguous strategic direction when he stated that “India will identify, track and punish every terrorist and their backers. We will pursue them to the ends of the earth.”
The present security forces and intelligence establishment heads are best poised to bridge the gap between the direction and execution. They are competent, and know what to do best and when. We need to repose our trust in the armed forces. The punitive strike may not be surgical, it may or may not be immediate, but rest assured it will be there in a form and manner to hurt the enemy the most.
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