understanding-capabilities-and-limitations-of-pak-drone-arsenal

By Brig RPS Kahlon, VSM (Retd)

 

The Pakistan DGMO proposed a mutual ceasefire on May 10, 2025. Indian DGMO, acquiesced, with the caveat of further talks between the DGMOs on May 12. Barely a few hours later, news channel were ablaze with reports of ceasefire violations, characterised by cross LC firing and presence of drones along the entire stretch of the IB and LC. While sporadic ceasefire violations were expected and par for the course, it was primarily the presence of drones, based on which a ‘failed ceasefire hysteria’ was built up by media. This, necessitated the Indian Foreign Secretary to make a late-night statement to calm and control the situation.

 

The ceasefire has held since so far. This raises the more important question that, are the Indian media channels and the common man by extension, so psychologically intimidated by drones that we start crying wolf on the slightest pretext? Or, conversely, is it what they do not know, and, fear this new animal of ‘Pakistan Drone Threat’? We need and have to understand the Pakistan drone capabilities, employment and thus, quantify the possible threat, because this animal is here not only to stay, but also to thrive.

 

What is a Drone?

 

Drones, also known more correctly as ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’ or ‘UAVs’, are remotely piloted, or, autonomously piloted (flying to a pre-decided course/destination) aerial platforms, which dominate modern military operations globally due to their precision, versatility, and high Return On Investment (ROI).

 

Initially, these platforms were repurposed from remotely piloted, ‘Aerial Targets, (AT)’, for surveillance and reconnaissance. Simplistically put, even today 90 per cent of the US UAV fleet consists of this category of birds, albeit upgraded to intelligence gathering and target designation from just recon.

 

They are relatively cheap, can be mass produced, and are easy to operate in the field, making them ideal for battle field surveillance and target acquisition. Over time, their capabilities expanded to include strike missions and intelligence gathering. They range from the tactical micro-UAVs like the Wasp which weighs less than a pound, to the strategic UAV platforms like the Global Hawk, which is more like an aircraft, flying at a high altitude with long endurance (HALE), and is dual tasked for surveillance, intelligence gathering and kinetic precise engagements both during day and night.

 

UAV’s/ drones were ideally placed as the poor man’s fighter aircrafts, able to do almost similar tasks, with lesser costs and attrition of human pilots. This certainly caught Pakistan’s eye. As it is, they had a ring side view of the effectiveness of the Reapers and later the Predators, operating in Afghanistan, Iraq from their Shamsi airfield. Their ability to take out High Value Targets (HVT) in the on-going anti-terrorist operations was most impressive. However, as time would prove, they were most effective in low intensity, anti-terrorist operations, where little or no modern Air Defense (AD) weapons were employed. In an AD weapon intense environment, they failed (as also in Operation Sindoor), and were subjected to high attrition. Houthi rebels have managed to shoot down six US Reapers on ‘Seek and Destroy’ missions over Yemen the ongoing conflict, for instance.  

 

Pak’s Journey from Procuring, Employing, to Manufacturing Drones

 

Pakistan has been dabbling with drones at the tactical level, after its experience of operating with Multi National Forces in Kuwait against Iraq in 1990s. Pointers and Ravens were the initial tactical drones procured by Pakistan. For the Indian Forces in Kargil war in 1999, seeing this tactical reconnaissance drones’ overhead was routine. This was supplemented by the cheaper and higher endurance Chinese ASN series of drones as they assimilated the ASV-206/ 207 for operational intelligence gathering and recon. It had an endurance of 4 to 8 hours and a ceiling of 6 km. It had an electronic warfare and countermeasure pod, apart from optical and laser designator payloads. Indian Forces deployed in Operation Parakaram after the Parliament attacks, in 2001-2002, routinely sighted slow-moving twinkling lights in the desert skies. These were Pakistan UAV surveillance mission in progress.

 

Post the 9/11 twin tower terrorist strike, and the subsequent ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT), which followed, Pakistan saw the efficiency of the American Reaper and Predator drones operating out of the Shamsi airfield. The PAF procured CH 4 A/B Chinese UAVs for a reaper/ predator akin strategic intelligence gathering and strike capabilities. Pakistan perfected drills and procedures for employing them effectively in counter-insurgency operations in Khyber Region, and Baluchistan. Pakistan has since acquired the more advanced Wing Long II UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) from China. It has also commenced licensed production of Buraq and Shahpur UAV based on the CH-4 and Wing Long Chinese UAV. Pakistan also procured UAVs from Turkey (TB2 Bayraktar), Germany (LUNA NG), Scan Eagle (US)and Italy (Falco) in limited numbers, possibly to have a more varied suite of payloads.

 

Assessed Capability of Pak Fleet of Recon, Strike and Tactical Drones

 

SER	NAME / NOMENCLATURE	NOS	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	REMARKS
UCAV / STRIKE CUM RECON DRONES
(a)	Wing-long II	50	China	MALE, inducted in 2022.
(b)	CH 4A/B	24	China
(c)	Anka (TAI Turkey)	24	Turkey	MALE, inducted in 2021Produced locally under license.
(d)	TB2 Bayraktar	20	Turkey	MALE, EO & IR sensors, carries LGB. Costs 5-6 million dollars
(e)	Akinci (HALE)	1+	Turkey	HALE, six contracted, first delivered in 2023.
(f)	LUNA NG	2+	Germany	Produced under license in Pak.
(g)	Falco	26	Italy	-do-
(h)	Burraq	13+	Pak	First flight in 2009. Can carry a laser guided bomb.
(j)	Shahpar II	20+	Pak	Potential successor of Burraq based on Wing Loong II. Costs between 3-5 million dollars
		180+
RECON ONLY DRONES
(k)	Shahpar (recce)	36	Pak
(i)	Uaqb NG (Navy)	20	Pak	In the process of being replaced by TB2
(m)	JASOOS II (SATUMA)	46	Pak	Tac level unmanned solution. 38 hp engine, 55 lbs of mission eqpt
(n)	Salaar (SATUMA)	30	Pak	-
	Total	132
ADDITIONAL TACTICAL RECON UAVS, NOS NOT ASCERTAINED
(o)	Bravo + (SATUMA)	-	Pak	Recon
(p)	NBX2	-	Pak	Tactical surveillance
(q)	Scan Eagle	-	US	Light weight Tactical recon
(r)	Songar Asiguard	-	Turkey	Tactical Strike & Recon, recently procured from Turkey

 

Analysis of the Lethality and Effectiveness of Pak Drones

 

The Pakistan drones are primarily based on Chinese technology.  There is also a large percentage of Turkish and western technology-based UAV in Pakistan inventory. It would be reasonable to assume that the interoperability between Chinese and western equipment is improbable. This will lead to command, control and data sharing restrictions. It was obvious that in the absence of effective networking, the employment of Pakistan drones would be, and was sub-optimal.

 

The more capable strategic/ operational drone system units amount to approximately 300, of which only 180 units have the ability to carry out kinetic strikes. Their employment would be prioritised, and controlled at the highest level. Their employment was further restricted by a robust and effective Indian AD intensive environment.

 

The Pakistan drone inventory does not have loitering ammunition, autonomous long endurance drones, kamikaze drones. These three facts not only impinged on the optimised employment, but also lead to a tactics where cheaper and less effective tactical drones were sacrificed in an effort to waste away/ engage Indian AD resources, or identify possible AD targets to burst in safe corridors after subsequent engagement. The effectiveness of this tactics was not evident in the four nights of air/ drone war.

 

The numbers for the tactical level drones are not ascertained. It would be reasonable to assume that they would be at least three times as much as the strategic/ operational drones. More important than number of drones available, is what percentage of these have an inherent capability of executing a kinetic strike?  Songar Asisguard drone is the only tactical level drone capable of kinetic strikes in shallow depth (6-9 km of the LC / IB), with its operational range limitation of 10 km.

The official statement of the MoD mentioned that “300 to 400 drones were employed against 26 targets across the entire Indian Wester Front”. They were either shot down or were neutralised. 

 

It can be inferred from this that if mathematically distributed, only 15 to 20 drones were aimed at a target. Even if there was a prioritisation of targets done, the numbers employed even against a high priority target would not be adequate to swarm and overwhelm the Indian AD system.

 

They would, however, serve the purpose of distracting AD missiles away from other more potent vectors with the aim to increase the probability of them hitting the target. This seems to be the case at least in the first wave of so-called swarm of drones and missiles attack directed against 15 targets in the first wave of Pakistan retaliation on the night of May 7-8. Eight missiles were shot down by the Indian AD gun system then. It clearly indicates that the IACCS was able to prioritise between the targets identified, and engage the ones more dangerous effectively.

 

The second wave on the night of May 8-9 targeted the airfields at Jammu, Amritsar, and Adampur, among others. They are in close vicinity of civilian populated area. They were targeted by drones which may have been just 15 to 20 in numbers, and effectively engaged by ground-based AD systems comprising of very short-range missiles and guns, in a matter of minutes. However, this was recorded and streamed on national TV in a loop, exaggerating its impact. Subsequent damage assessment revealed that no physical damage had taken place.

 

Over these two nights, a wrong perception was created in the common man’s mind of drones appearing out of nowhere and targeting civilian populated areas. Dramatised clips of drones having been shot down notwithstanding, it seems to have generated an image of all-potent drone which could hit anyone anywhere. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, in entire Punjab, there have been only three non-fatal casualties, due to a possible grenade dropped from a returning Songar Asisguard Drone, which offloaded its ordnance possibly because it saw a light indicating human presence. If the public had been made aware of this fact instead, the panic evoked by the presence of surveillance drones on night of May 10-11 after the ceasefire was declared would have been avoided.

 

Another objective that has been ascribed to the drone incursions was that it was to instigate the AD radars and systems to open up prematurely, so that the intelligence gathering drones could record them for future engagements. The enemy does not seem to have been successful in this endeavour either. For instance, the repeated engagement of the Adampur Air base to take on the S-400 Battery deployed there was a failure.

 

Except for the Songar Asisguard drone, no other drone has the capability of autonomous operations. It implies that in all other cases, the number of drones employed in any one sector would be limited by the number of pilots who can technically operate at one time, or are available in that sector. This was obvious when we look at number of drones assigned by Pakistan to a target in a sector. There were certainly no murmuration of drone swarms exhausting precious AD missiles, giving a clear run to cruise missiles or AC following in their wake to take on high value targets. 

 

Conclusion

 

To briefly sum up, Pakistan drone capability and threat was a ‘big ado about nothing’. The superior networking and counter drone kinetic and non-kinetic means woven into the layered Indian AD umbrella was effective in taking down the Pakistan drones, reportedly been employed in swarms. The panic induced by the Pakistan drones appearing in populated areas of J&K and Punjab, was more due to an ignorance of the Indian public rather than their actual capability to inflict damage. Drones proved to be like snakes. While 80 per cent of snakes are non-poisonous, similarly 80 per cent Pakistan drones were non-lethal, yet the perception of kill-all prevailed. Nothing that a bit of general awareness cannot correct.

 

The Pakistan drone arsenal today is more suitable for counter-insurgency operations. This may change by the next conflagration based on lessons learnt. India needs to keep on improving on its anti-drone weaponry, as well as building up on its offensive drone capabilities. Drones are effectively employed by Pakistan deep state for cross-border drugs and arms smuggling. Border states need to develop their own anti-drone grid for operations during peacetime. This would be a value addition to the already existing networked national air defense grid.