India’s decision to place the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance after the 2025 Pahalgam terror attack has reignited debate over water security, sovereignty and long-term strategic planning, with experts calling for a shift towards greater hydrological leverage.
The move followed the April 22 attack in Pahalgam that killed 26 civilians, prompting New Delhi to reassess its obligations under the decades-old treaty with Pakistan.
In an analysis published in Saviours Magazine, former bureaucrat K B S Sindhu described the 1960 agreement as “an act of remarkable — and ultimately imprudent — generosity”, arguing that India conceded a disproportionate share of river waters under assumptions that have not held.
Brokered by the World Bank and signed by then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan, the treaty allocated the eastern rivers: Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, to India, while granting Pakistan control over the larger western rivers: Indus, Jhelum and Chenab.
According to the analysis, this arrangement effectively gave Pakistan nearly 80 per cent of the basin’s total water flow, despite India being the upper riparian state.
“The arithmetic was staggering in its imbalance,” Sindhu wrote, adding that India had “willingly constrained itself” while Pakistan benefited downstream.
He argued that the suspension of the treaty is both legally defensible and strategically overdue, citing the principle of “fundamental change of circumstances” in international law, particularly in light of decades of cross-border terrorism.
“India is under no enforceable compulsion, in law or in conscience, to maintain a water compact that subsidises the agricultural economy of a state that exports terror,” he said.
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Beyond legal arguments, the analysis pointed to India’s underutilisation of its own water entitlements. Infrastructure delays in projects such as the Ranjit Sagar Dam and Shahpur Kandi Dam have allowed significant volumes of water to flow into Pakistan unused.
Sindhu noted that each year of delay resulted in substantial loss of India’s share of Ravi waters, even as groundwater levels in Punjab continue to decline.
On the western rivers, where the treaty permits limited storage and hydropower development, India has also lagged. While allowed to build up to 3.6 million acre-feet of storage, only a fraction has been realised, with hydropower potential of over 18 gigawatts remaining largely untapped.
The analysis further alleged that Pakistan had used the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms to delay Indian infrastructure projects through repeated objections and arbitration.
Placing the issue in a broader global context, Sindhu argued that international norms are increasingly shaped by national interest, with countries prioritising sovereignty over treaty obligations when strategic pressures mount.
“The lesson is unambiguous: nations, when sufficiently pressed, subordinate treaty text to sovereign survival,” he wrote.
The article also highlighted the strategic importance of water security for India’s internal stability, particularly in Punjab, where excessive groundwater extraction has raised concerns over long-term sustainability.
To address this, Sindhu proposed large-scale infrastructure initiatives, including diversion projects linking western and eastern rivers, construction of major storage dams such as Bursar and Sawalkot, and inter-basin transfer systems.
He also called for institutional reforms, including the creation of a National Indus Basin Authority and fast-tracked clearances for key projects.
Framing the suspension as a starting point rather than an end, Sindhu said India must translate policy signals into tangible outcomes.
“What comes next is not about revenge or headlines,” he wrote. “It is about transforming a political signal into a hydrological fact, and a hydrological fact into a strategic reality.”