indira-gandhi-s-fatal-error-of-judgement

October 31 marks 41 years of the assassination of former Prime Minister Ms Indira Gandhi. It was on the morning of October 31, 1984, as she had got ready to appear for a television interview that her two “trusted Sikh bodyguards” took her unawares and shot her dead point-blank, raining a shower of bullets on her from their automatic weapons. Although the doctors at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences in New Delhi desperately tried to revive her, they could not. Ms Gandhi’s assassination was followed up with vengeful killing of Sikhs across the country, more so in the national capital, Delhi, where bestial brutality was unleashed by the Congress supporters.

It was a gross and fatal error of judgement on part of Ms Gandhi to retain her Sikh bodyguards and keep them so close to herself, and that too heavily armed with sophisticated weapons. She ended up being the proverbial sitting duck for her bodyguards-turned-assassins.

The two Sikh bodyguards had been withdrawn from her security detail after Operation Bluestar. However, she insisted that they be deputed back for her security as she considered them like her own children. The bonding indeed was strong, as they had been deputed in her security for quite some time.

During the probe into her assassination, her Private Secretary RK Dhawan was thoroughly grilled for calling back the two Sikh bodyguards to “protect” her. Dhawan was even accused of being part of the conspiracy to get Ms Gandhi assassinated. Otherwise, he was asked, why would he get the two Sikh bodyguards back into her security when the anger was seething among the entire Sikh community against the destruction and devastation caused to the Golden Temple complex during the Operation Bluestar?

Dhawan’s argument that he had done it at the insistence of Ms Gandhi herself had no buyers. Why would she recall them back when the security and intelligence agencies had warned against it? Dhawan did not have any answer since Ms Gandhi was no longer around to confirm what he was saying in his defence.

It was the then Director of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) RN Kao, who corroborated Dhawan’s version in front of the investigators that he had personally been called by Ms Gandhi wanting her two Sikh bodyguards back in her security detail. Had it not been for Kao's evidence, Dhawan might well have been made a part of the conspiracy, even been convicted and sentenced as well.

In hindsight, Ms Gandhi would seem to have committed two “fatal errors” of judgement. First was sending the Indian Army into the Golden Temple and the second recalling her Sikh bodyguards.

In the first case, she obviously depended on her advisers as well as the Army generals. Given her strong and powerful persona, it is impossible to imagine that anyone could have contradicted her for going ahead with the military action on Golden Temple, where a band of militants led by Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale, duly assisted for Maj Gen (retired) Shabeg Singh, Bangladesh War hero, were hiding.

There was no alternative to the action against Bhindrawale and his men. They had to be flushed out. Selective killings across Punjab, particularly of those belonging to the Hindu community, had become a routine. Even those Sikhs who dared to differ with or oppose Bhindawale were not spared either. Situation had completely gone out of control. There was nationwide outcry against the targeted killings in Punjab.

It is widely believed that even senior Akali leaders from Punjab suggested some “strong action” against Bhindrawale and his men hiding in the Durbar Sahib complex. The Bharatiya Janata Party and other opposition parties were also building up pressure against the government for some decisive and strong action against the militants hiding inside the Durbar Sahib.

Ms Gandhi was reportedly told by the Army generals that the operation will be “very brief” and they will be able to flush out the militants within a few hours without any damage to the holy place. Notably, Durbar Sahib is the holiest place for the Sikhs.

But the action did not finish “within few hours”. It continued for days together. It was not any “clinical operation”, but something like a war as the militants hiding inside the Durbar Sahib complex were ably trained, guided and commanded by Gen Shahbeg Singh, already having the Bangladesh experience. The Indian Army suffered heavy casualties. The Operation continued for five days, leading to extensive damage to Golden Temple complex, particularly the Akal Takhat, the symbolic seat of religio-political power of Sikhs.

For Bhindrawale and Shahbeg Singh, the military action was a ‘win-win’ situation. Although the situation did not unfold exactly according to their plans, it did eventually lead to extensive and widespread alienation among the Sikh community. That is what they wanted to strengthen their cause. The chasm it caused and created between the Sikh and Hindu communities was too wide and too deep to be filled up completely, and too soon.

But Bhindrawale and Gen Shabeg had expected more. They were convinced that if and when the government of India decides to launch the Army on Golden Temple, there will be mass Sikh backlash and uprising across Punjab, along with an attack by Pakistan army on the borders. Gen Shabeg was banking on his Bangladesh experience and was convinced that Pakistan would do to India what India had done to Pakistan in 1971, by openly aligning with the Punjab rebels. Nothing happened. Although there were strong protests from the Sikh community, these were contained and restricted to specific places. There was no mass convergence towards Amritsar or Durbar Sahib.

The wily General Zia ul Haq, the then military dictator of Pakistan was too cunning and too smart to burn his fingers and order his Army to attack India. His purpose had already been served without getting directly and openly involved. It was the Indian Army against its own people. Bhindrawale and Gen Shahbeg had walked into his trap by provoking army action on Golden Temple. He backed out at the last moment when Bhindrawale and Gen Shabeg expected him to act. Why would he, when his purpose was already served? Probably it must have been his greatest moment that one of the Bangladesh War heroes was now fighting against his own Army.

Ms Gandhi’s first error of judgement was sending the Indian Army to the holiest places of Sikhs. It is like attacking Mecca for Muslims or the Vatican for Christians. Although in all likelihood she must not have expected tanks running into the Golden Temple parikrama, but they did. And it was our own Army against our own people and in our own holiest shrines. There definitely could be other ways and means than sending the Army to flush out the militants.
Second, she should not have recalled her Sikh bodyguards again into her security detail against the advice of her security and intelligence officials. Not only did the country lose a Prime Minister, it cost us tens of thousands of innocent lives in paranoid retribution across the country. Here, she appeared to have been guided by her heart rather than by her head.

Probably, in recalling her Sikh bodyguards back into her security detail, she wanted to convey a message across the Sikh community that she had nothing personal against anyone or the Sikh community and she still trusted them. But things usually don’t unfold the way you think these would, as happened in her case. She ended up being shot dead by the same two people, whom she trusted above everyone else and against everyone's advice under the misplaced belief that they were like her own children.

What a fatal error of judgement, which obviously had been made out of blind trust, with huge repercussions and long term consequences.