As Ukrainian officials meet US negotiators in Geneva, with the possibility of full three-way talks involving Moscow, Kyiv and Washington in early March, there is a glimmer of hope that an end to the conflict may be in sight. The fact that, after four years, this remains only a glimmer speaks volumes about the difficulty of ending the war.
Even Donald Trump, who once promised to end the war in a single day, has now stopped issuing ultimatums and deadlines to the warring parties.
In what has become a war of attrition, discussions about vulnerabilities and losses are meaningful only in comparison with those of the opposing side. Reflecting on how each side’s theories of victory have evolved over the past four years helps to explain the war’s overall trajectory.
Russia’s initial plan for a swift knockout blow to Ukraine was foiled within the first few days of the invasion. Instead, it settled into a strategy of grinding the enemy down through slow advances on the battlefield and debilitating attacks on energy infrastructure in the rear, with the expectation in Moscow that, at some point, Ukraine would capitulate.
The question, however, is whether Russia has sufficient manpower and economic resources to sustain this strategy.
Russia is now experiencing economic difficulties due to a combination of western sanctions and falling oil prices, which declined from over US$100 (£74) per barrel in 2022 to approximately $60 in 2025. By 2026, the Kremlin had raised taxes and reduced reliance on oil revenues, whose share of the state budget fell from 40% in 2019 to 25% in 2025. It is possible that the Kremlin recognises this situation cannot continue indefinitely.
Yet Russia’s weakness is relative to Ukraine’s. This also applies to war losses. President Vladimir Putin believes Ukraine’s manpower losses are higher than Russia’s — a view that contradicts some western estimates — and that Ukraine, with its smaller population, has less capacity to sustain prolonged conflict.
Ukraine’s theory of victory has also evolved. From an initial belief in outright military success in 2022–23, Kyiv shifted by 2025 towards exhausting Russian forces through extensive drone warfare. However, after Russian forces captured key strongholds such as Siversk, Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole, Ukraine’s defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, stated that Kyiv’s path to victory now lay in inflicting 50,000 Russian casualties per month — a figure exceeding most estimates of Russia’s monthly recruitment rate of around 30,000.
Western politicians and analysts have supported this view, arguing that Russia’s losses are unsustainable and justify continued backing for Ukraine.
However, after four years, Kyiv’s position has been complicated by the erosion of full US support. The Ukrainian frontline has been gradually pushed back and, in 2025, there was no major Ukrainian offensive for the first time since the invasion began.
Ukraine’s best hope may be to freeze the conflict along the current line of contact, secure western guarantees, join the EU and maintain pressure on Russia through sanctions. Yet each of these objectives faces significant obstacles.
Domestic challenges persist, western funding is declining, energy infrastructure has suffered severe damage, mobilisation remains unpopular and President Volodymyr Zelensky has been weakened by a corruption scandal involving close aides.
Crucially, however, Ukraine continues to fight. Its strongest hope may lie in a prolonged economic strain on Russia. Attacks on Russia’s oil sector were intended to accelerate that strain, but Moscow’s targeting of Ukraine’s energy grid has shown its capacity for escalation.
As all sides grow increasingly exhausted, the possibility of a negotiated settlement becomes more plausible. After four years, exhaustion, rather than victory, may offer the most realistic path to peace.
Also read: Stay on our side, Zelenskyy appeals to Trump
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