Last weekend, China’s Ministry of National Defence announced that the country’s two most senior generals, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, had been removed from office and placed under investigation for “serious disciplinary violations”.
Zhang had been the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) most senior general since October 2022. He was the highest-ranking military member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CCP), the party-state’s 24-member executive policymaking body.
He also served as the senior vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), which exercises command over China’s armed forces.
Liu, meanwhile, was the former commander of the PLA Ground Force and had most recently headed the CMC’s Joint Staff Department.
The developments triggered dramatic reactions outside China. British media initially described a “military in crisis”, while Australian outlets labelled the move an “astonishing” purge that leaves Xi Jinping almost alone at the apex of the world’s largest army.
The moves were undoubtedly surprising. However, given how little is known about the internal workings of the CCP leadership, including Xi’s relationships within the Politburo, interpreting these events with certainty is difficult, if not impossible.
What we know
For historical and political reasons, the PLA functions as an organisation of the CCP. Both fall under the direct authority of Xi, who simultaneously serves as President, CCP General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission.
The removal of Zhang and Liu temporarily leaves military leadership concentrated in the hands of Xi and General Zhang Shengmin. Three other members of the Central Military Commission have lost their positions since 2024 and have yet to be replaced.
Although the Chinese leadership is notoriously opaque, it is clear that disciplinary issues have plagued the military in recent years, particularly involving corruption and procurement within the PLA’s more technologically advanced branches. Since 2022, roughly two dozen senior military officials have been dismissed or placed under investigation.
Zhang and Liu were relatively recent appointees to their senior posts and were widely regarded as personal supporters of Xi. Notably, the fathers of Xi and Zhang shared a close relationship dating back to the CCP’s early days in the 1930s, well before the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
What adds to the surprise is the speed of their removals. Unlike previous high-profile dismissals, there were few warning signs. Both men had appeared publicly as recently as a month ago.
More startling still, a US media report claimed Zhang is accused of passing information on China’s nuclear weapons programme to the United States, alongside allegations of accepting bribes and forming “political cliques”.
Reading the tea leaves
Past precedent suggests that once a senior official is dismissed, their downfall is invariably accompanied by accusations of multiple crimes, regardless of the original trigger.
The Politburo has a history of intense internal political struggles, though the details often emerge only years later. A notable example is the mysterious death of Lin Biao in 1971, a former PLA commander and Mao Zedong’s designated successor.
Given the broader context of military management and governance in recent years, and the official claim that Zhang and Liu violated “discipline and the law”, two explanations appear plausible.
They may have been directly involved in corruption, including accepting bribes to secure appointments or procurement contracts. Alternatively, they may be held accountable for systemic corruption that occurred under their supervision, particularly in military procurement.
There is also the possibility of internal disagreement within the Central Military Commission and Politburo over how aggressively corruption should be tackled, especially within the armed forces.
Xi has repeatedly emphasised the importance of the anti-corruption campaign since assuming office in 2012. In recent weeks, he has elevated it further ahead of the forthcoming 15th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development.
On January 12, addressing China’s top anti-corruption body, Xi described corruption as a “major struggle”, warning: “The situation in the fight against corruption remains grave and complex. We must maintain a high-pressure stance without wavering, resolutely punishing corruption wherever it exists and leaving no place for corrupt elements to hide.”
To meet China’s developmental goals, he added, the CCP must deploy cadres who are “truly loyal, reliable, consistent and responsible”.
It is difficult to see Zhang, Liu or any other senior figure currently capable of challenging Xi, or to argue that Xi feels personally threatened by them.
In that sense, Xi’s personal authority is neither strengthened nor weakened by the dismissals.
Some analysts argue the disruption may have dented Xi’s confidence in the military, with a few suggesting it has reduced the likelihood of a near-term invasion of Taiwan.
The removal of so many leaders may indicate that the PLA is being pushed towards a deeper cultural overhaul. However, it would be stretching the evidence to conclude that China’s overall military capability, whether generally or in relation to Taiwan, has been decisively strengthened or weakened.
Also read: British PM lands in Beijing; meets Jinping
Via The Conversation
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